Oxford Bibliographies: Political Epistemology

Draft

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Political Epistemology

Introduction

Political epistemology lies at the intersection of political philosophy and epistemology. Put broadly, political epistemologists investigate the ways in which epistemological issues are at the center of our political lives. For example, they explore how claims of knowledge, truth, and expertise impact political decisions and forms of legitimate authority. Research in this domain ranges from asking questions about whether (and to what extent) legitimate authority hinges on epistemic evaluation of the process or outcome of political decisions to questions about epistemic virtues and vices of individuals in their role as political agents. Political epistemologists ask questions such as: which forms of government can leverage the collective wisdom of the public and to what extent does ignorance, propaganda, or misinformation undermine the legitimacy of collective decisions? What role should disagreement play in our political lives and how does disagreement impact society (i.e. does it lead to polarization or can it be productively leveraged to reveal blind spots based on different perspectives)? In what ways are socially and politically marginalized groups in a position of epistemic privilege vis-à-vis social structures?

While the term 'political epistemology' is fairly new, scholars have been interested in topics at the intersection of political philosophy and epistemology at least since Plato. Until recently, however, the literature in both political philosophy and epistemology proceeded largely in their own siloes, without explicit reference to -- or common framing of -- the questions. This newer reframing of the subfield of political epistemology explicitly draws on the insights from both areas of philosophy (as well as cognate areas like political science and social psychology). As a result, the past few years have witnessed an outpouring of new research that draws important and tighter connections between epistemology (especially social epistemology) and political philosophy. For example, new work has been published on propaganda, fake news, belief polarization, political disagreement, conspiracy theories, the epistemic merits of democracy, voter ignorance, irrationality in politics, distrust, and the epistemic harms of echo chambers. Political epistemology is now a flourishing area of philosophy.

Early Work

Politics and epistemology have frequently intersected in the history of philosophy, but political epistemology has only recently been recognized as a distinctive subfield of philosophy. We are therefore characterizing "early work" as pre-21st-century. This section includes classic works by Plato 1997 and Aristotle 1998, neither of whom was a friend of democracy for largely epistemic reasons: they thought ordinary citizens are too uninformed to govern themselves well. Mill 1991 was more optimistic about citizens in liberal democracies; but he, too, worries about citizen incompetence and thus proposed that more knowledgeable citizens should have extra votes. Downs 1957 agrees with Plato (and others) that voters may be ignorant, but he claims that voter ignorance is rational because the cost to be adequately informed is too high for most people. Dewey 1927 reject's Plato's "rule by experts" in favor of a pragmatist view of public deliberation, which many scholars regard as a precursor to modern "deliberative democracy" (discussed below). As a pragmatist, however, Dewey set aside the search for unchanging and timeless moral truths. Adrendt 1967 picks up on the fraught relationship between politics and truth, and she carefully examines the ways in which truth and power come into conflict. Cohen 1986 provides the first contemporary articulation of an "epistemic" conception of democracy. This seminal article continues to inform work on epistemic democracy, such as Estlund's 1993 attempt to give the notion of truth a central role in democracy -- but without risking the elitism of Plato and, to a lesser extent, Mill. In contrast to the epistemic democrats, Rawls 1993 famously takes the stance of "epistemic abstinence," rejecting the relevance of truth for justifying certain principles of justice. Gaus 1996 raises a number of criticisms against Rawls and attempts to defend political liberalism partly on epistemic terms.

Arendt, Hannah. 1967. "Truth and Politics." *The New Yorker* **Feb 25.**

A seminal article exploring the conflict between politics and truth. Arendt reflects on Plato's idea that truth-telling can obstruct the survival and flourishing of the state, and she asks when lying is a necessary and justifiable political tool. A great starting point for those interested in how to balance epistemic goals with political goals.

Aristotle. 1998. *The Politics*. **Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing.**

We find the roots of deliberative democracy and collective wisdom in Aristotle's *Politics*. Although Aristotle was no defender of democracy, he argues that "the many" may be better rulers than "the virtuous few", at least when the judgments of the many are pooled together. This epistemic argument for popular rule has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists.

Cohen, Joshua. 1986. "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy." *Ethics* **97(1): 26-38.**

Perhaps the first contemporary articulation of epistemic democracy. This exploratory paper outlines an epistemic interpretation of voting, called 'epistemic populism.' Cohen reflects on the structure of epistemic populism and maintains that it is a more plausible interpretation of populism than some alternatives.

Dewey, John. 1927. *The Public and Its Problems*. **New York: Henry Holt.**

Dewey's first major work in political philosophy and an important work in pragmatist political philosophy. It includes reflections on the future of democracy in the era of mass communication, social complexity, and pluralism. Dewey rejects Plato's idea of a political technocracy, a system of governance in which decision-makers are comprised of an elite of technical experts.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. **New York: Harper & Row.**

A classic statement of the view that political ignorance is actually rational for most citizens. Downs argues that voters have little incentive to become informed because there is a vanishingly small chance that their

vote will affect the outcome of an election. An important text for theories of voter ignorance and irrationality.

Estlund, David. 1993. "Making Truth Safe for Democracy." In *The Idea of Democracy*. Edited by David Copp, Jean Hampton, John Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

A response to epistocracy, or rule by the knowers. Estlund raises the following difficulty for epistocratic authoritarianism: Who will know the knowers? Estlund does not defend skepticism; he argues that no knower is knowable enough to be accepted by all reasonable citizens. These ideas are part of the foundation for his landmark book, *Democratic Authority: An Epistemological Framework*.

Gaus, Gerald. 1996. *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Addresses many central issues in moral and political philosophy through epistemological investigations. The book's central question is: "How do we justify our moral judgements, both to ourselves and others?" Gaus raises a number of criticisms against Rawls's political liberalism and develops a distinctive epistemological position in defense of political liberalism.

Mill, John Stuart 1991 [1861]. *On Liberty and Other Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In *On Liberty*, Mill defends the epistemic value of free discussion and disagreement as a means to finding the truth. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill defends a version of epistocracy (rule by the knowers) that gives extra votes to citizens with more education, which serves as a proxy for determining which citizens are more knowledgeable about matters relevant to politics.

Rawls, John. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

This book set the agenda for discussions of reasonable disagreement in politics. Rawls famously argues for a turn to public reason, which remains agnostic about controversial truth claims, in order for the justification of political power to be legitimate in the context of reasonable disagreement about the good life.

Plato. 1997. *Republic*. In *Plato: Complete Works*. Edited by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing.

Perhaps the first attack on the epistemic merits of democracy. Plato believed political decision-making required rule by experts, since citizens in a democracy couldn't be trusted to make competent decisions. He therefore advocated 'epistocracy', the rule by the knowers.

Epistemic Democracy

Democracy has been defended on moral, procedural, and epistemic grounds. According to the epistemic conception of democracy, democratic procedures such as deliberation and voting are valuable in part because of their epistemically benefits. Anderson 2006 offers a helpful analysis of three epistemic models of democracy, arguing in favor of the Deweyan model. Fricker et al. 2018 includes a section on epistemic democracy that has both defenses and critiques of epistemic democracy. Peter 2007 also includes a helpful overview and critique of different epistemic defenses of democracy before developing her own version of epistemic proceduralism. Her version is contrasted with another epistemic proceduralist account defended by Estlund 2008, who argues that democracy is legitimate because it is epistemically best among the morally available options. While Peter and Estlund look at the epistemic value of the outcome of the democratic procedure, Talisse 2009 looks at the value of democratic practices for responsible individual epistemic agency. Lynch 2012 defends the importance of reason for democratic politics in the face of skepticism about the value of exchanging reasons.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 2006. "The Epistemology of Democracy." *Episteme* 3(1): 8-22.

Investigates the epistemic powers of democratic institutions via three epistemic models of democracy: the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem, and Dewey's experimentalist model. One of the best known defenses of Dewey's model over alternative epistemic approaches to democracy.

Estlund, David. 2008. *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework*. Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press.

One of the best known attempts to ground democratic legitimacy on epistemic outcomes. Estlund argues that democratic theorists cannot legitimately ignore questions of epistemic competence and performance. He argues that democratic decisions are legitimate because democratic procedures are epistemically best among the morally available options.

Fricker, Miranda., Peter Graham, David Henderson, & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen. 2018. *The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology*. New York: Routledge.

This handbook includes a section on "The Epistemology of Democracy", which has chapters on the benefits and criticisms of epistemic democracy, the relationship between pragmatism and epistemic democracy, epistemic proceduralism, and the epistemic role of science in liberal democracy.

Lynch, Michael. 2012. *In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

A lively defense of reason, giving reasons, and pursuing rational debate against passion, prejudice, manipulation, coercion, and skepticism about the role of reason in judgment.

Talisse, Robert. 2009. *Democracy and Moral Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

A concise defense of democracy by appealing to "folk epistemology". The main claim is that only in a democracy can an individual practice proper epistemic agency. This is because believing and asserting commit us to certain epistemic activities associated with the open exchange of reasons and evidence, and these activities implicitly commit us to a democratic society.

Peter, Fabienne. 2009. *Democratic Legitimacy*. London: Routledge.

Analyzes the requirements for democratic legitimacy, breaking down aggregative, deliberative, and Rawlsian approaches. This book defends a view called "pure epistemic proceduralism" according to

which a democratic decision is legitimate "if it is the outcome of a procedure that satisfies conditions of both political and epistemic fairness" (3). This differs from views that place the epistemic value of democracy in its ability to track the correct outcome.

Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democrats argue that deliberation is important for political legitimacy, with theorists disagreeing about whether deliberation is morally valuable for showing respect and/or whether it has epistemic value. Cohen 1989 provides an influential defense of the value of democratic deliberation that helped spark the vast literature in deliberative democracy. Bohman and Rehg 1997 is an influential collection of essays by leading theorists on deliberative democracy, which includes reflections on the "epistemic turn" in deliberative democratic theory. Habermas 1996 is an important early defender of democratic deliberation, and Misak 2008 defends a pragmatist version of deliberative democracy that appeals to the epistemic quality of the decisions supplied by democratic procedure. Bohman 2006 emphasizes the epistemic value of including diverse perspectives in deliberation. Landemore 2017 analyzes the epistemic turn in deliberation, while Landemore and Estlund 2018 give a thorough review of the literature and critiques of deliberative democracy. For other helpful overview articles, see Marti 2006 and Min and Wong 2018. Young 1996 offers an influential critique of the ways traditional accounts of deliberations perpetuate existing social inequalities, while Ackerman and Fishkin 2002 offer an influential proposal to enable contemporary societies to capture the value of deliberative democracy in practice.

Ackerman, Bruce and James Fishkin. 2002. "Deliberation Day." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* **10(2): 129-152.**

A novel proposal for a national holiday called "Deliberation Day." On this day, a sample of registered voters would be called together in neighbourhood meeting places to discuss central campaign issues two weeks before major national elections. It is an attempt to have an informed public that more closely reflects the epistemic ideal of the deliberative democratic citizen.

Bohman, James and William Rehg (eds.). 1997. *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*. **Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.**

An essential anthology with key essays on deliberative democracy. Many chapters defend deliberative procedures in terms of their epistemic value, including a focus on epistemically correct outcomes as well as the claim that democratic procedures embody norms of reasonableness or communicative rationality. The anthology also includes direct challenges the the epistemic turn in deliberative democracy.

Bohman, James. 2006. "Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity." *Episteme* **3(3): 175-191.**

Argues that epistemic diversity optimizes deliberation. Contrary to Mill, the basis for epistemic improvement is the inclusion of all perspectives rather than the inclusion of all social groups, or cultural identities. The outcomes of deliberation will often provide a robust basis for further inquiry, even if they are not more likely true according to some independent standard.

Cohen, Joshua. 1989. "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy." In *The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State.* **Edited by Alan Hamlin and Phillip Petit. New York: Blackwell.**

An influential early defense of the value of deliberative democracy that outlines an ideal deliberative procedure.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. **Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.**

A foundational work in deliberative democracy. Although Habermas identifies deliberation as instrumental for producing the good outcomes, the epistemic role of deliberation is more ambiguous. He regards deliberation as a "reasonable basis for a common practice" rather than instrumental for a "correct

outcome". But the majority opinion is said to be fallible and open to revision if the "minority convinces the majority that their views are correct".

Landemore, Hélène and David Estlund. 2018. "The Epistemic Value of Democratic Deliberation." In *The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy*. **Edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren. Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

A thorough review of the epistemic value of democratic deliberation. It traces epistemic democracy from Cohen (1986) through Estlund (2008) and Landemore (2012), and looks as both deliberative and aggregative forms of epistemic democracy. It also considers some major objections to the alleged epistemic value of democratic deliberation, as well as replies to these objections. A great starting point for newcomers to this topic.

Landemore, Hélène. 2017. "Beyond the Fact of Disagreement? The Epistemic Turn in Deliberative Democracy." *Social Epistemology* **31(3): 277-295.**

An overview of the epistemic turn in deliberative democracy. Landemore argues in favor of the epistemic dimension of democratic authority and defends the truth-tracking properties of democratic procedures. Following Cohen (1986) and Estlund (2008), she claims that the Rawlsian requirement of epistemic abstinence with respect to the truth-value of moral and political claims is unsustainable.

Martí, José Luis. 2006. "The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy Defended: Reasons, Rightness, and Equal Political Autonomy." In *Deliberative Democracy and its Discontents*. **Edited by Samantha Besson and José Luis Marti. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.**

A great overview that highlights various conceptions of deliberative democracy, specifically pure proceduralist views and epistemic views. Martí argues that non-epistemic forms of deliberative democracy are implausible. That said, an adequate epistemically instrumental conception of deliberative democracy must include a fair or proceduralist dimension in order to avoid elitism.

Min, John B. and James K. Wong. 2018. "Epistemic Approaches to Deliberative Democracy." *Philosophy Compass* **13(6): e12497.**

A comprehensive overview of the major theoretical issues and findings concerning epistemic approaches to deliberative democracy. It explores the normative foundations of epistemic deliberative democracy, the problem of epistocracy, and the conditions under which deliberative democracy can achieve its goal of "tracking the truth". A useful starting point for this topic.

Misak, Cheryl. 2008. "A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy." *Episteme* **5(1): 94-105.**

An epistemic argument for democracy rooted in the pragmatist tradition. Misak treats politics as a kind of inquiry that, like science, aims at truth. The best method for achieving this aim is a deliberative conception of democracy. Thus, Misak claims we should value decisions that are reached via open debate and deliberation because this method is more likely to get things right than alternative forms of democracy.

Young, Iris Marion. 1996. ''Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy.'' In *Democracy and Difference*. **Edited by Seyla Benhabib. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.**

An influential critique of standard conceptions of deliberative democracy. Young argues that the deliberative ideal of free and reasoned deliberation perpetuates existing inequality. The norms of "good" (i.e. rational) political communication are not neutral, but tend to reflect the communicative styles of

already powerful social groups. She recommends that we expand our understanding of political communication to include more affective elements, such as greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling.

Democracy and Collective Intelligence

Epistemic approaches to democracy come in at least two forms: deliberative and aggregative approaches. The previous section focused on deliberative epistemic democracy, while the current section focuses on aggregative approaches to democracy. On this view, aggregating individual preferences through equally   weighted voting is likely to lead to the truth. A foundational work in this area is List and Goodin 2001, who explore Condorcet's jury theorem -- a political science theorem about the relative probability of a given group of individuals arriving at a correct decision. List and Goodin claim that a reasonably large number of voters will perform well in epistemic terms, which favors democracy on epistemically instrumentalist grounds. Goodin and Spiekermann 2018 provide more detailed treatment of Condorcet jury theorem and its prospects for democratic theory. Another landmark work in this area is Landemore 2012, who argues that democracy is epistemically better than non-democratic rivals because "the rule of the many" allows for diverse perspectives, which leads to epistemically superior outcomes. Similar perspectives on this theme can be found in Landemore and Elster 2012, an edited volume that explores the claim that democracy benefits from "collective wisdom". Taking a critical view of this idea, Ancell 2017 argues that the conditions needed to bring about collective wisdom are not satisfied in actual liberal democracies; thus, the studies on which Landemore relies actually undermine her claim that democracy is epistemically superior to non-democratic alternatives. Sunstein 2006 is more optimistic than Ancell: he claims that aggregating information collected via the Internet will more reliably lead to truth than democratic deliberation, since the latter runs epistemic risks that result in polarization and false belief. Ober 2013 takes a historical view of this issue, drawing on Aristotle and the legislative process in classical Athens, and argues that democracy is epistemically best when it combines elements of both aggregative and deliberative democracy.

Ancell, Aaron. 2017. "Democracy Isn't That Smart (But We Can Make It Smarter): On Landemore's Democratic Reason." *Episteme* 14: 161-175.

A critique of Landemore's foundational book, *Democratic Reason*, where she argues that democracy is epistemically better than any non-democratic rival (i.e. relying on experts or benevolent dictators). According to Ancell, the studies on collective intelligence on which Landemore relies actually undermine, rather than support, the view that democracy is epistemically better than any non-democratic alternatives.

Goodin, Robert E. and Kai Spiekermann. 2018. *An Epistemic Theory of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The most recent and thorough examination of Condorcet's jury theorem and how it can be applied to the real world. The theorem is used to assess various political practices, revealing how to increase the truth-tracking potential of majoritarian democracy. This book makes the technical results relating to jury theorems more accessible, and it uses the Trump and Brexit campaigns as case studies for how epistemic democracy might be undermined.

Landemore, Hélène. 2012. *Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A landmark work in the study of collective intelligence and democratic theory. Landemore says that democracies are not just fairer than non-democratic alternatives, they are also "smarter" because they produce better outcomes. This book nicely surveys the historical roots of the epistemic argument for democracy, provides a defense of the idea that cognitive diversity trumps individual ability, and rejects the pessimistic view that citizens are too incompetent to govern themselves.

Landemore, Hélène and John Elster (eds.). 2012. *Collective Wisdom: Mechanisms and Principles*. **Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.**

A non-technical volume exploring the conditions under which many minds can be wiser than one. The contributors have backgrounds in economics, cognitive science, philosophy, political science, law, and history.

List, Christian and Robert E. Goodin. 2001. "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem." *Journal of Political Philosophy* **9: 277-306.**

Explores the scope and potential power of the Condorcet jury theorem, which they call the "jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats" (283). List and Goodin claim that as long as there is a reasonably large number of voters, virtually any of the social decision rules that are commonly recommended on democratic-proceduralist grounds will perform reasonably well on epistemic grounds.

Ober, Josiah. 2013. "Democracy's Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment." *American Political Science Review* **107(1): 104-122.**

Draws on Aristotle to defend an epistemic conception of democracy that blends aspects of both aggregative and deliberative approaches. According to Ober, the legislative process in classical Athens was neither fully aggregative nor purely deliberative, but rather combined deliberation with voting based on judgments about the reputations and arguments of experts in a domain. This article adds an important historical perspective to the literature on deliberative democracy.

Sunstein, Cass. 2006. *Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge*. **New York: Oxford University Press.**

An important book about the democratic processes of the Internet. Various methods for aggregating information are explored and compared, including surveys, deliberation, prediction markets, blogs, and wikis. Sunstein is optimistic that aggregating information can help us arrive at the truth without running the epistemic risks created by deliberation, such as amplification of errors and group polarization.

Epistemic Critiques of Democracy

Democracy has been defended on epistemic grounds, but it has also been critiqued on the grounds that citizens are too epistemically incompetent to govern themselves. We find this idea most clearly in Brennan 2016, who argues that democracy should be replaced with epistocracy. Ahlstrom-Vij 2012 shares Brennan's worry about voter incompetence, but he takes this to be problematic for deliberative democracy in particular. Ahlstrom-Vij recommends that we rely on information markets instead of deliberation. Somin 2010 and Ingham 2013 also raise influential objections to epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy. Sunstein provides a more empirical critique of democratic deliberation, focusing specifically on the ways in which citizens become polarized when they deliberate with like-minded individuals. Peter 2016 moves away from epistemically instrumentalist views and argues that epistemic democrats must defend democracy in non-instrumentalist epistemic terms. Schwartzberg 2015 provides an excellent overview of epistemic democracy and its challenges.

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. 2012. "Why Deliberative Democracy Is (Still) Untenable." *Public Affairs Quarterly* 26 (3): 199-220.

A defense of the democratic value of information markets. Ahlstrom-Vij argues that voter incompetence presents a problem for the deliberative democrat: citizens who deliberate socially are unlikely to rectify each other's individual ignorance. He therefore recommends that we rely on information markets instead.

Brennan, Jason. 2016. *Against Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

An attack on democracy and defense of epistocracy. Brennan argues that voter incompetence has dire consequences, so we should consider replacing universal suffrage with "the rule of the knowledgeable." This may take many forms, such as extra votes for degree holders, a council of epistocrats with veto power, a qualifying exam for voters. This sort of intellectual elitism may worry some, but Brennan claims that epistocracy is a plausible alternative to democracy.

Ingham, Sean. 2013. "Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy." *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 12(2): 136-155.

Argues that epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy, which aim at consensus on the "right" decisions, conflict with two widely held assumptions in political philosophy. First, disagreements about politics do not (and often should not) disappear after discussion. Second, justifications of democratic procedures should not presuppose substantive agreement on the outcomes because to do so builds in controversial assumptions about which decisions are right.

Peter, Fabienne. 2016. "The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy." In *The Epistemic Life of Groups*. Edited by Michael S. Brady and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Argues that democracy cannot be defended on epistemically instrumentalist grounds. Either we must defer to those who know the correct answer (which isn't democratic) or we must insist on the decision procedure itself (which isn't epistemic). Peter develops a non-instrumental epistemic defence of democracy that draws on the epistemology of disagreement.

Schwartzberg, Melissa. 2015. "Epistemic Democracy and Its Challenges." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 187-203.

A clearly-written overview of the literature on epistemic democracy. Schwartzberg traces the contemporary origins and more ancient roots of epistemic democracy, and then evaluates the evidence in

favor of this view. She concludes that more empirical testing is needed before we can justify democratic decision making on epistemic grounds.

Somin, Ilya. 2010. "Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance." *Critical Review* **22(2-3): 253-279.**

Argues that widespread political ignorance and irrationality undermine the goals of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats mistakenly assume that citizens are able to actively participate in serious dialogue over political issues, but most voters are neither informed enough nor unbiased enough to make deliberative democracy work.

Sunstein, Cass. 2000. "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes." *The Yale Law Journal* **110: 71-119.**

A nice overview of the group polarization literature and its implications for deliberative democracy. Sunstein critiques deliberative democrats for being insufficiently empirically informed, and he explores the real-world consequences of deliberation. The main finding is that deliberation with like-minded people leads deliberators to polarize.

Politics and (Post) Truth

Politics and truth have always had a fraught relationship. In the *Republic*, Plato recommended that the political elite propagate a "noble lie" to maintain social harmony. Arendt 1967 picks up on this theme, claiming that lies have always been regarded as "necessary and justifiable tools" of the politician's trade. She goes on to explore the complicated and precarious relationship between truth and politics, arguing that truth itself has "tyrannical tendencies". Williams 2002 regards the idea of truth as necessary for political life and maintains that public allegiance to truth is a safeguard against tyranny. In a similar vein, Lynch 2004 defends the role of truth in protecting human rights and the political value of truth more generally. Coady 2012 touches on many topics within political epistemology, such as rumors, experts, and conspiracy theories, but these issues all center around the role and value of truth in politics. Similarly, the volume by Elkins and Norris 2012 includes many essays that defend the essential role of truth in democracies. In our post-truth era, it is especially clear that truth and politics are on bad terms with each other. McIntyre 2018 traces the roots of "post-truth politics" to a variety of factors, including the postmodernism tendency to question the notion of objective truth. We find expression of this idea in Fuller 2018. In contrast, Misak 2000 argues that truth ought to be reinstated as central to political philosophy, but she takes a more pragmatist line than Lynch and other defenders of objective truth.

Arendt, Hannah. 1967. "Truth and Politics." *The New Yorker* **Feb 25.**

Explores the fraught relationship between politics and truth. Arendt distinguishes different kinds of truth (e.g., 'factual' and 'rational') and argues that some are more threatening to politics than others. The connection between politics and respect for truth is said to be complex and precarious: truth is needed for political life, yet the truth is "coercive" and thus threatens freedom.

Coady, David. 2012. *What to Believe Now*. **Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.**

Argues for taking an "applied" turn in epistemology that considers epistemic questions about everyday life, including discussions of whether rumors can be a source of knowledge, the epistemic status of conspiracy theories, and the role of expertise and nontraditional media sources.

Elkins, Jeremy and Andrew Norris. 2012. *Truth and Democracy*. **Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.**

An interdisciplinary collection of 18 essays that defend the relevance of truth for democratic politics. It includes a broad range of perspectives from history, political science, philosophy, and other areas. The volume is part of the "epistemic turn" taken by democratic theory, which aims to show not only why, but also how, truth matters to democracy.

Fuller, Steve. 2018. *Post Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game.* **London: Anthem Press.**

A provocative counter-narrative to the academic defense of expertise and objective truth. Fuller argues that leaving important matters to "experts" encourages blind trust in authority and weakens democratic institutions. He defends the postmodern view that facts have "always existed in the state of scare quotes, not only in politics but also in science".

Lynch, Michael. 2004. *True to Life: Why Truth Matters*. **Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.**

A defense of the idea that objective truth matters, is a worthy goal of inquiry, and is an important part of living a good life. This book ends with an analysis of the political value of truth, particularly defending the importance of truth for protecting human rights.

McIntyre, Lee. 2018. *Post-Truth*. **Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.**

A compact book that traces the development of the post-truth phenomenon from the increasing dismissal of science and evidence through fake news, psychological biases, postmodernism, and our retreat into echo chambers. A highly readable attempt to explain how we arrived in this post-truth world and what might be done to counter it.

Misak, Cheryl. 2000. *Truth, Politics, Morality*. **London: Routledge.**

Argues for a pragmatic conception of truth as the aim of moral and political deliberation. Misak builds on Pierce's pragmatic conception of truth, which holds true beliefs are those that survive extensive inquiry, standing up to the evidence and reasons. This account of truth helps Misak salvage the centrality of truth to political deliberation, even in a pluralistic society characterized by conflict.

Williams, Bernard. 2002. *Truth and Truthfulness*. **Princeton: Princeton University Press.**

Argues that truth must be socially acknowledged as having intrinsic value to make human cooperation possible. Williams says that political life cannot do without the idea of truth and public allegiance to truth is a safeguard against tyranny. A highly relevant book in the context of "post-truth politics".

Fake News, Misinformation, and Propaganda

There has been a wave of interest in fake news as a result of recent political events (e.g., the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and the Brexit referendum in the U.K.), but political theorists have long been interested in forms of misinformation and propaganda. Frankfurt 1986 analyzes the notion of "bullshit" and sets the stage for later work on "post-truth politics". Stanley 2015 argues that propaganda is a threat to liberal democracies and, more specifically, to the epistemic conceptions of democracy defended by Estlund 2008 and Landemore 2012. Brown 2019 expands on this idea, arguing that all cases of misinformation -- not just those qualifying as propaganda -- threaten the epistemic potential of democratic decision-making. This may lead one to wonder what differences there are between "fake news" and other forms of political deception. Gelfert 2018 attempts to precisify the notion of "fake news" and contrasts it with other forms of public disinformation. Rini 2017 also analyzes the notion of "fake news" and argues that individually rational behavior may be collectively harmful by spreading fake news. O'Conner and Weatherall 2019 empirically investigate how misinformation spreads within communities, and Levy 2017 explores the dangers of misinformation. He argues that misinformation is even more harmful than people realize because it continues to shape our behavior even after false beliefs have been debunked. Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2019 argue that conservatives are especially susceptible to disinformation and lies because the right-wing media ecosystem has more propaganda.

Benkler, Yochai, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts. 2019. *Network Propaganda*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A comprehensive study of the media ecosystem surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This book looks at the shape, composition, and practices of the United States political media landscape, and finds that the current epistemic crisis of media and democracy are not the result of Russian interference, social media algorithms, or microtargeting, but rather an asymmetric media structure that involves partisan media ecosystems. This is an open-access title and available to read for free online.

Brown, Etienne. 2019. "Propaganda, Misinformation and the Epistemic Value of Democracy." *Critical Review* 30(3-4): 194-218.

Argues that all misinformation (both deliberate propaganda and inadvertent misinformation) threatens epistemic conceptions of democracy, especially the view defended by Landemore 2012. Focusing on the spread of online misinformation, the paper considers the extent to which fact-checking and deliberation can safeguard us from misinformation.

Frankfurt, Harry. 1986. *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

An analysis of bullshit that distinguishes bullshit (when a speaker simply lacks concern for the truth or falsity of their statements) from lying (when a falsehood is presented as if true). An influential book for work on "post-truth politics."

Gelfert, Axel. 2018. "Fake News: A Definition." *Informal Logic* 38(1): 84-117.

Reviews a number of definitions of "fake news" and identifies their shortcomings. Gelfert argues that "fake news" is a term that should be reserved for cases in which false or misleading claims are deliberately presented as news and are misleading "by design". This definition is contrasted with other types of disinformation and used to pinpoint conditions for the spread of fake news.

Levy, Neil. 2017. "The Bad News About Fake News." *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 6(8): 20-36.

Argues that fake news is more harmful than many people realize because it affects our beliefs and behaviors even when we know the information is false, and even when our misperceptions are corrected. Levy argues that we must work to avoid fake news and eliminate it rather than simply attempt to correct false beliefs.

O'Conner, Cailin and James Owen Weatherall. 2019. *The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

An important work in formal social epistemology that studies how misinformation spreads via social networks. The authors use computer simulations to investigate the flow of (mis)information within communities, specifically scientific communities. Although the book's focus is not centrally on politics, insights about political misinformation and propaganda are derived from the main arguments.

Rini, Regina. 2017. "Fake News and Partisan Epistemology." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 27(2): 43-64.

A highly influential article on fake news. Rini provides an analysis of the concept of "fake news" and argues for a surprising conclusion: even though fake news is false and damaging, the testimonial practices propelling it are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. This paper also has an interesting discussion of the (lack of) testimonial norms on social media.

Stanley, Jason. 2015. *How Propaganda Works*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A widely read work on political propaganda. Stanley considers how propaganda works within liberal democracies in ways that draw on existing flawed ideologies to perpetuate existing inequalities. This book distinguishes between two types of propaganda: supporting propaganda (which increases the realization of the ideals by emotional or nonrational means) or undermining propaganda (which is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals in order to erode those very ideals).

Political Disagreement and Polarization

Political debates are increasingly polarized in Western-style democracies. Citizens have highly unfavorable views of each other, often regarding each other as immoral, stupid, lazy, and even threats to each other's way of life. How can citizens disagree productively? What is the rational response in the fact of widespread disagreement on moral and political issues? The volumes by Feldman and Warfield 2010 and Christensen and Lackey 2013 provide essential overviews of the epistemology of disagreement. These are great starting points to survey the field. Feldman 2007 introduces some of the key questions that are taken up in the epistemology of disagreement. Shifting to political disagreement in particular, Mason 1993 investigates why political disagreement is so intractable. Sunstein 2002 surveys the empirical literature on "belief polarization" and worries that deliberation with our fellow citizens can be epistemically harmful. This idea is further discussed by Lynch 2019, who draws on cognitive psychology to explore the dangers of identity politics and polarization. Mason 2018 argues that identity politics has led Americans to become increasingly polarized in terms of their *attitudes* even though they tend not to disagree about the *issues*. This is likely a result of entrapment in "echo chambers", which is discussed by Nguyen 2018. According to Kappel 2017, political disagreement has even spread to the acceptance of basic political facts. This makes political compromise and progress especially difficult. As a potential antidote, Talisse and Aikin 2013 emphasize the importance of proper argument for individual wellbeing and a well-functioning democracy.

Christensen, David. and Jennifer Lackey. 2013. *The Epistemology of Disagreement*. **Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

A collection of essays by leading epistemologists surveying the debate between conciliationism and steadfastness, peer disagreement within philosophy, and epistemic significance of disagreement. Questions discussed include: When should disagreement lead us to rationally revise our beliefs? Is it self-defeating to "conciliate" in the face of disagreement?

Feldman, Richard. 2007. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In *Philosophers Without Gods*. **Edited by Louise Antony. Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

An important work for introducing the "uniqueness thesis", which says there can be no reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers when the parties share all of their respective evidence for the truth or falsity of the propositions in question. Epistemic peers who have shared evidence cannot maintain their own belief and think that the other party to the dispute is reasonable in this case.

Feldman, Richard and Ted Warfield. 2010. *Disagreement*. **Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

A foundational text in the epistemology of peer disagreement, spanning a range of approaches to this question from leading epistemologists.

Kappel, Klemens. 2017. "Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* **20(2): 313-331.**

Explores what political legitimacy requires in cases of fact-dependent policy disagreement. This occurs when a persistent disagreement about a set of policy options is rooted in a disagreement about a non-normative factual assumption. Kappel argues that political philosophers should pay more attention to fact-dependent policy disagreements and he outlines routes to further explore this issue.

Lynch, Michael. 2019. *Know-It-All Society*. **New York: Liveright.**

A portrayal of how arrogance in political culture promotes tribalism, closed-mindedness, and polarization. Lynch interweaves insights from classic philosophical thinkers like Hume, Locke, Wittgenstein, and

Arendt with new research in cognitive psychology to explore the dangers of identity politics and the need for a strong dose of humility to recover democratic values.

Mason, Andrew. 1993. *Explaining Political Disagreement*. **Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.**

Examines a number of different theories for why political disagreement is so intractable. Mason outlines two broad conceptions of political disagreement: the "imperfect conception" assumes that political disagreement is a result of one party making an error; the "contestability conception" maintains that the proper use of political terms allows for a variety of reasonable interpretations. This relates to epistemological debates about the possibility of reasonable disagreement.

Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. **Chicago: University of Chicago Press.**

A new perspective on the issue of political polarization. Mason distinguishes "issue polarization" from "behavioral polarization": the first type is characterized by an increase in the extremity of issue positions, while the second type is characterized by increasing partisan strength, partisan bias, and anger. Mason claims that even when Democrats and Republicans agree on policy outcomes, they tend to view one another with distrust and to work for party victory over all else.

Nguyen, C. Thi. 2018. "Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles." *Episteme* **1-21. DOI: doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32.**

Distinguishes "epistemic bubbles" from "echo chambers." In an epistemic bubble, members lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. In an echo chamber, members are brought to systematically distrust outside sources of information: alternative perspectives are actively undermined. Nguyen argues that echo chambers are harder to escape, call for more radical solutions, and better explain the post-truth phenomenon.

Sunstein, Cass. 2002. "The Law of Group Polarization." *Journal of Political Philosophy* **10: 175-195.**

An essential overview of the phenomenon of "group polarization," which occurs when deliberation causes a group (and the individuals who compose it) to move towards a more extreme version of their pre-deliberative judgments. Sunstein explores the political and legal implications of this idea and uses it to explain extremism, radicalization, and the behavior of political parties.

Talisse, Robert and Scott Aikin. 2013. *Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide to Political Disagreement*. **London: Routledge.**

An accessible introduction to argumentation theory, with special emphasis on the way argument works in political debates. Talisse and Aikin emphasize the importance of proper argument for individual wellbeing and a well-functioning democracy. This guide to argumentation is filled with examples from contemporary politics, including the 2016 U.S. election and first years of Trump's presidency.

The Epistemic Dimensions of Public Reason

Political liberalism is one of the most influential theories in political philosophy, a central piece of which is the idea that political power is legitimate only when it can be publicly justified to others on the basis of public reasons. Rawls 1993 initiated these debates and he famously argued for the need to avoid appealing to the truth of particular moral views in order for political power to be legitimate. This set off a number of critiques (Hampton 1989, Raz 1990, Barry 1995, Wenar 1995, Gaus 1996, Estlund 2017, van Wietmarschen 2018) and responses to salvage Rawls's theory (Quong 2007, Cohen 2009, Liveriero 2015). Hampton 1989 offered the first influential critique of Rawls's turn away from truth in political justification, followed shortly by Raz's 1990 critique of epistemic abstinence in politics. (Rawls's theory had been developing in article form before the book cited here). Cohen 2009 argues for a modifications to Rawls's theory to rescue the place of truth in political liberalism. Estlund 1998 agrees with Raz that political liberalism needs the truth; however, a single point of moral truth is sufficient--the truth of Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy. Barry 1995 argues that Rawls's theory may require skepticism, whereas Quong 2007 defends political liberalism against this influential critique. Wenar 1995 focuses on Rawls's discussion of reasonable persons. He argues that the epistemic claims in the burdens of judgment make political liberalism controversial among reasonable doctrines.

Barry, Brian. 1995. "John Rawls and the Search for Stability." *Ethics* **105(4): 874-915.**

An influential early paper investigating the extent to which Rawls's insistence on the fact of reasonable pluralism rests on skeptical epistemic claims.

Cohen, Joshua. 2009. "Truth and Public Reason." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* **37(1): 2-42.**

Argues that truth should play a role in public, political argument and develops a "political conception" of truth that is useful for public justification, since it is able to steer clear of philosophical controversies about truth and thus can play a role within Rawlsian public reason.

Enoch, David. 2017. "Political Philosophy and Epistemology: A Case of Public Reason." In *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy***, vol.3. Edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall. Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

Argues that public reason theorists have not adequately spelled out their epistemological commitments. Enoch rectifies this by drawing out implicit epistemological commitments public reason theorists make and analyzes these claims in relation to contemporary discussions in epistemology. He concludes that public reason theorists' epistemological commitments are largely indefensible.

Estlund, David. 1998. "The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth." *Ethics* **108: 252-275.**

Argues that political liberalism cannot be entirely freestanding from truth claims. They must hold that the liberal principle of legitimacy is true.

Gaus, Gerald. 1996. *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory***. New York: Oxford University Press**.

Argues for a conception of public political justification that is grounded on an epistemological argument for open justification. The first part of the book contains Gaus's epistemological argument for open justification and the second two sections applies this position to political matters.

Hampton, Jean. 1989. "Should Political Philosophy be done without Metaphysics?" *Ethics* **99 (4): 791-814**.

This paper is among the first influential pieces to critique Rawls's turn towards an overlapping consensus that brackets appeals to the truth. Hampton cautions against turning away from truth and towards mutual acceptability, arguing that public pursuit of the truth about justice is consistent with engaging in respectful disagreement with others in a pluralistic society.

Quong, Jonathan. 2007. 'Political Liberalism without Scepticism.' *Ratio* **20: 320-340.**

Argues against the skeptical critique of political liberalism, which holds that public reason's requirement to abstain from relying on the truth about the good life amounts to a form of skepticism that people can reasonably reject, thereby making political liberalism internally inconsistent.

Rawls, John. 1993. *Political Liberalism.* **New York: Columbia University Press.**

Famously argues for a turn to public reason, which remains agnostic about controversial truth claims, in order for the justification of political power to be legitimate in the context of reasonable disagreement about the good life.

Raz, Joseph. 1990. "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* **19: 3-46.**

Argues against both John Rawls's and Thomas Nagel's turn toward an epistemic abstinence as a way of tackling diversity of perspectives.

van Wietmarschen, Han. 2018. "Reasonable Citizens and Epistemic Peers: A Skeptical Problem for Political Liberalism." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* **26: 486-507.**

Draws out the epistemic commitments of political liberalism's ideal of reasonable citizenship and argues that, if a conciliatory view of peer disagreement is true, this leads to a new skeptical problem for political liberalism: either reasonable citizens must believe their sectarian commitments are unjustified or their belief that their sectarian commitments are subject to peer disagreement is unjustified.

Wenar, Leif. 1995. "Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique." *Ethics* **106: 32-62.**

Argues that *Political Liberalism* extends beyond a purely political conception of justice by including the burdens of judgment, reasonable moral psychology and political constructivism, all of which are controversial among comprehensive doctrines. Most relevant to political epistemology is Wenar's critique of the burdens of judgment (41-48).

Political Ignorance and Political Irrationality

Are citizens capable of governing themselves? Do ignorance and irrationality pose a threat to the goals of democracy? Plato 1997 provides an early discussion about the harms of voter ignorance for Athenian democracy and an endorsement of epistocracy, or rule by experts. Brennan 2016 shares Plato's worry about the harms of voter ignorance and offers a modern defense of epistocracy, one that is grounded in research from cognitive psychology and political science. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Somin 2013, and Duffy 2018 are case studies in the extent and depth of voter ignorance. Somin maintains that voter ignorance is instrumentally rational because voters know (at least implicitly) that their vote has almost no chance of making a relevant difference. Huemer 2016 maintains that most people are not just ignorant but *irrational* when it comes to politics; meanwhile, Caplan 2008 says that voters are "rationally irrational": *viz.*, it makes sense for voters to form their political beliefs in ways that satisfy their desire for comfort, belonging, and tribal allegiance. We might therefore wonder what alternatives to democracy are reasonable in light of public ignorance and/or irrationality. Guerrero 2014 says we should ditch elections and instead use lotteries to select political officials, since lotteries will bypass some problems of voter incompetence. Lopez-Guerra 2010 is also in favor of lotteries but wants to keep elections; he thus recommends an "enfranchisement lottery" whereby voting is restricted a randomly chosen group of citizens. This promises to improve the quality of electoral outcomes because enfranchised voters have greater incentives to become informed about the relevant political issues.

Brennan, Jason. 2016. *Against Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A highly provocative and interesting defense of epistocracy, which draws on much empirical research in psychology and political science. Brennan argues that citizens are too poorly informed ('hobbits') or informed but too biased and irresponsible ('hooligans') for democracy to function well. He therefore reject's Mill's idea that political participation makes us smarter and nobler, and he returns to Plato's argument against democracy.

Caplan, Bryan. 2008. *The Myth of the Rational Voter*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

An influential defense of the theory of "rational irrationality". Caplan says that voters have incentives to not only be ignorant (rational ignorance) but also to engage in highly biased evaluation of the information they do have (rational irrationality). In other words, it is instrumentally rational for an individual to be epistemically irrational on most political issues. This book is highly relevant to discussions about partisan bias, polarization, and politically motivated reasoning.

Delli Carpini, Michael and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

A comprehensive analysis about the American public's knowledge of politics. The book is motivated by the idea that democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed. Drawing on extensive survey data, they find that most people lack even the most basic political information. A highly influential study of political ignorance.

Duffy, Bobby. 2018. *The Perils of Perception*. Atlantic Books.

A case study in how people know little about basic facts on key social issues, such as levels of crime, immigration, and foreign aid. This book explores not only how little voters know, but also the psychological reasons that cause us to misperceive the world. It also makes direct connections to Brexit, social media, fake news, and other contemporary issues.

Guerrero, Alexander. 2014. "Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42: 135-178.

Argues that using lotteries to select political officials would be better than electoral representative democracy along a number of normative dimensions. Lottocracy may also bypass some problems of voter incompetence; for instance, systems that use lottery selection will likely result in more ideologically, demographically, and socioeconomically diverse representatives, which may improve the quality of the outcomes due to improvements in the cognitive diversity of the group.

Huemer, Michael. 2016. "Why People Are Irrational About Politics." In *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology*. Edited by Jonathan Anomaly, Geoffrey Brennan, Michael Munger, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A defense of the view that most people are irrational when it comes to politics. Huemer considers three alternative explanations for the prevalence of political disagreements, but he finds them inadequate. They are: the "miscalculation theory" (mistakes are common because political issues are complex); the "ignorance theory" (there is insufficient information available to all); and the "divergent-values theory" (political issues turn on moral/evaluative issues).

Lopez-Guerra, Claudio. 2010. "The Enfranchisement Lottery." *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics* 10(2): 211-233.

An important article outlining an alternative to democracy. Lopez-Guerra compares universal suffrage (one person, one vote) with an "enfranchisement lottery," which would restrict voting to a randomly chosen group of citizens who are provided in-depth information relevant to an election. He claims that enfranchisement would create a better informed electorate and thus improve the quality of electoral outcomes; however, it would likely threaten political stability because it is seen as less fair.

Somin, Ilya. 2013. *Democracy and Political Ignorance*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

A foundational text on political ignorance as "rational ignorance". Somin surveys the extent of political ignorance and argues that voters do not know enough to satisfy the demands outlined by many theories of democratic participation, such as deliberative democracy and retrospective voting. Somin doubts that we can significantly increase political knowledge, so he suggests we try to reduce impact of ignorance by limiting and decentralizing government power.

Sullivan, Shannon and Nancy Tuana (eds.). 2007. *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

An important collection of essays on racial ignorance and how racially motivated forms of ignorance are used for oppression. The essay contributors identify problematic limitations and assumptions in traditional ways of philosophizing and suggest ways we might transform our epistemic practices to improve knowledge of social realities.

Plato. 1997. *The Gorgias*. In *Plato: Complete Works*. Edited by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing.

An early discussion about the implications of voter ignorance for Athenian democracy. Plato argues that democracy is defective because it adopts policies based on the views of the ignorant common citizens and neglects the better informed counsel of experts.

Epistemic Virtues and Vices in Politics

Epistemologists have long been interested in the nature and significance of epistemic virtues--or those character traits that promote intellectual well being. More recently, however, epistemologists have been exploring the political significance of epistemic virtues (as well as epistemic vices). In her landmark book on epistemic injustice, for example, Fricker 2007 emphasizes the virtue of testimonial justice, which allows hearers to detect and correct for the influence of identity prejudice when assessing a speaker's credibility. Anderson 2012 extends Fricker's notion of epistemic justice to the level of social systems, and Dotson 2014 argues that some forms of oppression are distinctively epistemic. Buchanan 2004 also considers epistemic virtue at the institutional level; he argues that liberal institutions have epistemic virtues which safeguard citizens from false beliefs. Medina 2012, who also draws on Fricker, claims that we have a responsibility to cultivate epistemic virtues like humility and open-mindedness (which he calls "virtues of the oppressed"), as well as eliminate epistemic vices like arrogance and closed-mindedness (which he calls "vices of the privileged"). Cassam 2019 provides the first extensive coverage of "vice epistemology" and uses real examples drawn from the realm of politics to develop a theory of epistemic vice. Tanesini 2016 provides an account of one of these epistemic vices, namely, intellectual arrogance. Lynch 2018 argues that intellectual arrogance is especially harmful to democracy because it diminishes participation, obstructs knowledge, and undermines the value of truth.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 2012. "Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions." *Social Epistemology* 26(2): 163-173.

A complement to Fricker's focus on epistemic virtues. Anderson says we must scale up the virtue of epistemic justice from individuals to systems and she considers what is required for epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems. Specifically, she focuses on the need to integrate diverse institutions and people engaged in inquiry, so that social groups are educated together on terms of equality.

Buchanan, Allen. 2004. "Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 32(2): 95-130.

A defense of the epistemic virtues of liberal institutions. Buchanan worries that our epistemic dependence on others makes us vulnerable to socially inculcated false beliefs, which puts us at prudential and moral risk. He argues that key liberal institutions help safeguard us from these risks (by identifying epistemic authorities on the basis of objective merits), while still allowing citizens to reap the benefits of a social division of epistemic labor.

Cassam, Quassim. 2019. *Vices of the Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The first book exclusively dedicated to the study of epistemic vices. An epistemic vice is a psychological quality that systematically obstructs knowledge acquisition, retention, and transmission, and for which the individual is blameworthy. Examples include closed-mindedness, arrogance, and epistemic insouciance (lack of concern for the truth). Cassam demonstrates the political importance of this topic by exploring real-life political cases where epistemic vice led to disastrous consequences.

Dotson, Kristie. 2014. "Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression." *Social Epistemology* 28(2): 115-138.

Argues that there is a distinctively epistemic form of oppression that is not reducible to social or political forms of oppression. It occurs when one's contribution to knowledge production is hindered by persistent epistemic exclusion, i.e., when one is prevented from utilizing widely shared epistemic resources.

Fricker, Miranda. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Identifies the primary forms of epistemic injustice and highlights the importance of the corresponding virtue of epistemic justice. Epistemic injustice includes (a) not taking someone seriously in their capacity as a knower and (b) depriving someone of the conceptual resources needed to understand their experiences. To remedy these injustices, we require two virtues of epistemic justice: specifically, testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice.

Lynch, Michael. 2018. "Arrogance, Truth, and Public Discourse." *Episteme* **15(3): 283-296.**

Investigates what is required for public discourse to be "reasonable". Lynch argues that our attitudes towards each other matter; i.e., we must be willing to listen to each other; we must not be contemptuous of alternative perspectives; we must not be arrogant. He then explores the harms of arrogance to public discourse.

Medina, José. 2012. *The Epistemology of Resistance***. Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

Starting from Fricker's 2007 claim that there are distinctly epistemic kinds of injustice, Medina argues that we should use our epistemic resources and abilities to undermine oppressive normative structures. He calls this "epistemic resistance." He says we have a responsibility to eliminate the "epistemic vices of the privileged" and help cultivate the "epistemic virtues of the oppressed."

Tanesini, Alessandra. 2016. "Calm Down, Dear: Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance." *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* **90(1): 71-92.**

Provides an account of intellectual arrogance, outlines some of its ethical and epistemic harms, and explains the role of intellectual arrogance in fostering intellectual vices (such as timidity and servility in other agents). Tanesini argues that intellectual arrogance tends to create and maintain various forms of ignorance, specifically by silencing others and fostering self-delusion in arrogant individuals.

The Epistemic Obligations of Citizens

A common belief is that democracies require informed voters if they are to function well. Does this mean that voters are epistemically obligated to vote in light of adequate information? Do citizens acquire certain epistemic obligations if they decide to vote? Goldman 1999 probes what type of knowledge voters need for democracy to flourish. Christiano 2001 expands on Goldman's theory of "core voter knowledge" and argues that voter ignorance can undermine the ideal of democracy. Baurmann and Brennan 2009 also elaborate on Goldman's article, identifying many additional sources of knowledge that are required for a healthy democracy. Brennan 2011 argues that voters are typically morally required to abstain from voting precisely because they are inadequately informed. In contrast, Tsoi 2018 argues that citizens have a moral duty to be politically engaged, or at least a duty to cultivate a "readiness to participate in politics". Maskivker 2016 defends a view that both Tsoi and Brennan accept: that citizens who vote have an obligation to vote well. Similarly, Bøyum 2018 argues that citizens in a democracy have a duty to educate themselves politically. Fantl 2018 explores our obligation to challenge our own beliefs, even those beliefs that we cherish most. Along similar lines, Worsnip 2018 maintains that we have an obligation to consume news media from diverse perspectives, not just those that align with our pre-existing views. In the cases of both Fantl and Worsnip, the requirement to challenge our beliefs is an important antidote to closed-mindedness and political polarization.

Brennan, Jason. 2011. "The Right to a Competent Electorate." *Philosophical Quarterly* **61(245): 700-724.**

A challenge to the conventional idea that citizens have a positive duty to vote. Brennan argues that voters have both epistemic and moral obligations to vote well, if they do vote. In other words, one's reasons for voting must be morally and epistemically justified. However, most voters do not meet this competency requirement. Thus, Brennan argues that most citizens have a moral obligation to abstain from voting.

Baurmann, Michael and Geoffrey Brennan. 2009. "What Should the Voter Know?" *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **79: 159-186.**

A response to Goldman 1999, who argues that voters require "core voter knowledge" for democracy to function successfully. Baurmann and Brennan outline various additional sources of voter knowledge and discuss the relevance of epistemic trust for the availability, acquisition, and dissemination of voter knowledge.

Bøyum, Steinar. 2018. "The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself." *Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics***, 12(2): 129-141.**

Argues that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically: the moral importance of voting places an epistemic demand on voters to be competent. Bøyum conceives of this duty, in Kant's terminology, as a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow citizens.

Christiano, Thomas. 2001. "Democracy and Social Epistemology." *Philosophical Topics* **29(1/2): 67-90.**

A critical evaluation of Goldman 1999, specifically on the central role of voter knowledge in a democracy. Christiano argues that the ideals of democracy are betrayed when citizens are ignorant of what is going on in their society.

Fantl, Jeremy. 2018. *The Limitations of the Open Mind***. Oxford: Oxford University Press.**

Explores our obligation to engage with difficult arguments against our own cherished beliefs. Fantl says we often *shouldn't* engage with difficult counterarguments -- contrary to aspects of the Millian political

tradition and political liberalism. Fantl provides a fresh exploration of human fallibility, the role of experts, and the alleged virtue of open-mindedness. In making this case, Fantl discusses echo chambers, group polarization, the epistemology of disagreement, and many other themes at the heart of political epistemology.

Goldman, Alvin. 1999. *Knowledge in a Social World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

A foundational text in social epistemology, including a chapter on the epistemic requirements of democracy. Goldman explores the sort of knowledge that voters need in order for democracy to function well.

Maskivker, Julia. 2016. "An Epistemic Justification for the Obligation to Vote." *Critical Review* 28(2): 224-247.

Rejects the popular idea that voting is a political freedom which citizens have a right to exercise at their discretion. Maskivker argues that we have a duty to vote, but this is a duty to vote knowledgeably and with a sense of impartiality. She argues that this obligation promotes the epistemic advantages of democracy.

Tsoi, Siwing. 2018. "You Ought to Know Better: the Morality of Political Engagement." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 21: 329-339.

Argues that citizens have a pro tanto moral duty of political engagement, that is, a duty to "cultivate and maintain a readiness to participate in politics". Although this is described as a moral duty, it has numerous epistemic aspects; for instance, citizens are required to learn about what the government is up to, evaluate its actions, and learn what one can do to intervene politically, if necessary. In short, citizens have a moral duty to "know better".

Worsnip, Alex. 2019. "The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media." In *Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy*. Edited by Carl Fox and Joe Saunders. London: Routledge.

Argues that we have an obligation to diversify our news sources. When we are deciding what media to consume, it is wrong for individuals to consume news from media sources that overwhelmingly align with our political viewpoints. Instead, we are morally and epistemically obligated to include viewpoints other than our own.

Epistemic Paternalism

Are government agents ever justified in interfering with the inquiries of another person, without that person's consent, simply because it is for the inquirer's own epistemic good? In short, is it okay to curtail someone's epistemic freedom? These questions are taken up by Ahsltrom-Vij 2013, who provides a book-length treatment of epistemic paternalism. Goldman 1991 provides an early exploration of epistemic paternalism, with a focus on rules of evidence in the American legal system. Thaler and Sunstein 2008 provide a highly influential defense of the idea that humans are not fully rational and will often make choices that thwart their own interest, so governments should engineer "choice environments" to promote good decisions. Sunstein 2014 provides a follow up defense of "libertarian paternalism", where he argues that individuals are often not in the best position to know what is good for themselves.

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. 2013. *Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

A detailed defense of epistemic paternalism. Ahlstrom-Vij argues that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for their own epistemic good without consulting them on the issue. By drawing on fields like law, experimental randomization in medical research, and clinical diagnosis and prognosis, this book raises important questions about when it is okay to curtail someone's epistemic freedom.

Goldman, Alvin. 1991. "Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society." *The Journal of Philosophy* 88(3): 113-131.

Explores many ways in which epistemic paternalism is practiced, such as the rules of evidence in US criminal trials. Goldman argues that, even from a purely epistemic point of view, an agent with control over the evidence available to others shouldn't always make that evidence available (even when the cost is negligible). In short, epistemic paternalism is sometimes acceptable.

Sunstein, Cass. 2014. *Why Nudge?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

An argument against Mill's "Harm Principle," which says the government may only legitimately exercise power over individuals who would cause harm to others, not to oneself. Drawing on psychology and behavioral economics, Sunstein challenges the "Epistemic Argument" for the Harm Principle, which says that individuals are in the best position to know what is good for them.

Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. 2008. *Nudge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

A hugely influential defense of "libertarian paternalism" -- the view that people should be free to choose what they want, but we should also try to influence (i.e. "nudge") people's behavior for the better. This book raises important questions like: Can nudges promote democratic values? Are they allowed in elections and referenda? Do they undermine our ability to deliberate for ourselves?

Trust, Expertise, and Doubt

How to identify experts and when to trust authority figures are pressing issues for citizens in a democracy. On the one hand, reliance on experts is essential because ordinary citizens do not know enough about complicated political issues. On the other hand, it is unclear whether citizens are equipped to identify reliable experts rather than pseudo experts. Goldman 2001 takes up this issue. He recommends a variety of epistemic strategies that novices can use to evaluate the relative expertise of different epistemic authorities. Anderson 2011 continues along this line, offering criteria for non-experts to assess the reliability of expert testimony. Guerrero 2016 finds some of these suggestions inadequate and he concludes that institutional reform is likely required to improve our ability to identify genuine expertise. Nguyen 2018 is slightly more optimistic: he thinks that novices can adequately evaluate expertise, but he acknowledges that we run the risk of trapping ourselves in "echo chambers" by selecting bad experts. Nichols 2017 argues that members of the public no longer trust experts, while Moore 2017 seeks to explain how expertise can be democratically legitimate in the midst of this "crisis of expertise". O'Neill 2002 explores the role of trust in society and whether there is evidence for a crisis of trust. The volume by Braithwaite and Levy 1998 focuses on the role of trust in the state more generally. Hardwig 1991 provides a classic statement of the importance of trust in science; Tetlock 2005 argues that political experts are often no better at making predictions than novices.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 2011. "Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony." *Episteme* **8(2): 144-164.**

Explores whether ordinary citizens are competent enough to evaluate public policies justified by technical scientific reasoning. Anderson is optimistic: she provides criteria for non-experts when assessing and relying on experts and expert testimony. By focusing specifically on the case of anthropogenic global warming, Anderson argues that ordinary citizens with Internet access are able to make reliable second-order assessments of expert testimony.

Braithwaite, Valerie and Margaret Levi (eds.). 1998. *Trust and Governance.* **Russell Sage Foundation.**

An anthology focusing on the role of trust in the state. The book explores the basis for trusting the state; what difference a trustworthy state makes; how trust affects representative democracy; and the mutual reinforcement of trust and trustworthiness.

Goldman, Alvin. 2001. "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **63(1): 85-110.**

A classic exploration of the novice/expert problem, that is, how can non-experts determine which of two purported experts to believe in cases of expert peer disagreement? Goldman explores a variety of epistemic strategies that novices can use to assess the relative expertise of different experts.

Guerrero, Alexander. 2016. "Living with Ignorance in a World of Experts: The Problem of Expert Testimony." In *Ignorance: Moral and Social Dimensions.* **Edited by Rik Peels. London: Routledge.**

Explores how non-experts can reasonably rely on expert testimony. Guerrero argues that there are many contexts in which we have some reason not to trust the expert. Drawing on Anderson 2011 and others, he considers several possible ways in which non-experts might identify the epistemic integrity of experts (e.g., looking at track records, possible biases, etc.), but finds many of these suggestions unsatisfactory. He concludes that certain kinds of institutional reform might greatly improve our epistemic situation.

Hardwig, John. 1991. "The Role of Trust in Knowledge." *Journal of Philosophy* **88: 693-708.**

A seminal paper and a great starting point for inquiring into the role of trust in science. Hardwig challenges the epistemic individualism that runs through the history of epistemology, and he claims that the collective nature of science makes it impossible for modern knowers to be epistemically independents. As a result, trust plays an important role in the collective pursuit of knowledge.

Moore, Alfred. 2017. *Critical Elitism: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Politics of Expertise*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Examines the "crisis of expertise" and the role of experts in democratic deliberation. Moore explores the tension between expertise and democracy, and he seeks to explain how expertise can be democratically legitimate. Moore works within the framework of deliberative democracy and defends the idea that the epistemic authority of experts derives its political force from processes of popular contestation.

Nichols, Tom. 2017. *The Death of Expertise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A popular book about the increasing level of public hostility toward expertise. Nichols explores the relationship between experts and citizens in a democracy, why that relationship is collapsing, and what we can do about it. This book also discusses the ways in which modern technology exacerbate this problem.

Nguyen, C. Thi. 2018. "Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts." *Synthese*: 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1692-0.

Investigates how we can successfully identify and assess experts in fields where we are not experts. Nguyen is moderately optimistic that novices have some resources for finding experts; however, he acknowledges that this runs the epistemic risk of "runaway echo chambers", where we pick out bad experts that reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities.

O'Neill, Onora. 2002. *A Question of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Explores the nature of trust, its role in society, and whether there is evidence for a crisis of trust. O'Neill argues that a lack of trust in public institutions (and the people who run them) will have a debilitating impact on democratic societies. She then explores whether trust can be restored through increased transparency and making people and institutions more accountable.

Tetlock, Philip. 2005. *Expert Political Judgment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A contemporary classic in the literature on expert political opinion. Tetlock explores whether the world is too complex for us to reliably understand and predict political phenomena. He evaluates the predictions from experts in different fields and concludes that experts are often no better at making predictions than most other people. Further, they are rarely held accountable when things go wrong.

Science and Politics

Some scientists are hesitant to say that science is political, since this admission may compromise the gold standard of objective, unbiased research. On the other hand, scientific research is a social activity and, according to some scholars, an inherently political one. Longino 1990 challenges the idea that science can be pursued in value-free environments -- she says it is laden with social values. Similarly, Kitcher 2001 points out that scientific research doesn't take place in a vacuum; it ought to be guided by respect for democracy and informed democratic deliberation. Shapin 1994 provides a compelling historical analysis of the way scientific inquiry is shaped by social values and context, and Oreskes and Conway 2011 document the ways in which politics can corrupt science and lead to disastrous consequences for public health and the public's perception of science. Kahan et al. 2011 illustrate that our beliefs about scientific issues are often shaped by our political values.

Kahan, Dan, Henk Jenkins Smith, and Donald Braman. 2011. "Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus." *Journal of Risk Research* **14(2): 147-174.**

Argues that members of the public will disagree with issues on which there is scientific consensus when scientific facts are not congenial to one's values. Kahan calls this "cultural cognition" and argues that it shapes individuals' beliefs about climate change, the effect of concealed carry laws, and other political matters. This article also explores the implications of cultural cognition for public policy.

Kitcher, Philip. 2001. *Science, Truth, and Democracy*. **New York: Oxford University Press.**

A foundational work at the intersection of science and politics. Kitcher's central thesis is that democracy should guide science in its search for truth. When deciding what types of science to pursue, this ideally ought to be done in open democratic fora.

Longino, Helen. 1990. *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry*. **Princeton: Princeton University Press.**

A challenge to the conventional idea that science is properly pursued in value-free environments. Longino argues that this common belief is not supported by general accounts of scientific methodology: there are social and normative dimensions to scientific debates. The description, presentation, and interpretation of scientific data is often affected by assumptions that are laden with social values.

Oreskes, Naomi and Erik Conway. 2011. *Merchants of Doubt*. **London: Bloomsbury.**

A hugely important book that documents how a handful of politically conservative scientists, with strong ties to particular industries, spread doubt and confusion in order to undermine scientific consensus on issues like tobacco, global warming, acid rain, the ozone hole, and DDT. Oreskes and Conway explain how certain scientists were able to mislead the public and deny well-established scientific knowledge over four decades, as well as influence public opinion and policy making.

Shapin, Steven. 1994. *A Social History of Truth*. **Chicago: University of Chicago Press.**

A historical analysis of the role of trust in 17th-century science. Shapin argues that one's social status (i.e. being a gentleman) served as a proxy for epistemic status. This book has informed subsequent work in feminist epistemology, specifically about the politics of trust and the way epistemic credibility gets unevenly distributed on the basis of social status and identity prejudice.

Feminist Political Epistemology

Feminist thinkers have been doing groundbreaking work in the realm of political epistemology, long defending connections between structural and political features of both how knowledge is produced and recognized, as well as how different social positions contribute to the social knowledge of a political community. Alcoff and Potter 1993 includes important essays by feminist epistemologists that helped set some key genres of feminist political epistemology. Tanesini 2015 gives a comprehensive guide to the current literature and Grasswick 2018 offers a helpful and accessible overview of the leading debates in feminist social epistemology, drawing explicit attention to the connections between knowledge and politics. Longino 1990 and 2002 defends the influential view that rational knowledge is built through social processes. Anderson 1995 argues that gender influences what is taken to be knowledge, while Jones 2002 extends the discussion to show how political subordination influences claims of credibility. Collins 1989 influential essay establishes the idea that oppressed groups have a unique form of knowledge based on their political position. Young 2000 builds on this work to show why democracies need deliberation across differences in order to gain a more complete knowledge of the political community. Basu 2019 argues that beliefs should be governed by both moral and epistemic norms, drawing out the wrongs of even epistemically justified racist beliefs.

Alcoff, Linda Martín and Elizabeth Potter. 1993. *Feminist Epistemologies*. London: Routledge.

This anthology contains essays from the leading feminist epistemologists of the time and considers topics ranging from the subjectivity of individual knowers to epistemological communities, including discussions of marginalizaiton and priviledge.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 1995. "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense." *Hypatia* 10(3): 50-84.

Outlines feminist epistemology as a branch of naturalized social epistemology that studies how gender influences what is taken to be knowledge. This is notably distinct, Anderson argues, from thinking there is any unique form of feminine knowledge.

Basu, Rima. 2019. "The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs." *Philosophical Studies* 176(9): 2497-2515.

Explores what's wrong with rational racist beliefs; that is, racist beliefs that happen to be accurate and are rationally justified (as a result of racist attitudes and institutions). Basu argues that our beliefs are governed not only by epistemic norms, but also moral norms. As a result, we may wrong others in virtue of our beliefs about them, even if these beliefs are epistemically justified in a racially unjust world.

Collins, Patricia Hill, 1989. "The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 14(4): 745-773.

An immensely influential piece arguing that black women (and other marginalized groups) have a unique standpoint of knowledge about their own oppression. This standpoint arises from Black women's political and economic status which leads to a distinctive set of experiences that inform this knowledge base.

Grasswick, Heidi. 2018. *Feminist Social Epistemology*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

A very helpful overview of feminist epistemology, drawing connections to the political project of feminist theory and the ways that influences knowledge practices and knowledge production. This includes discussions of social models of knowers and democratic processes of knowledge production, as well as discussions of epistemic injustice, epistemologies of ignorance, and the influence of feminist epistemology on social epistemology.

Jones, Karen. 2002. "The Politics of Credibility." In *A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity*. Edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt. Boulder, CO: Westview.

This essay, in a volume of analytic feminist thinkers covering each major genre of philosophy, analyzes the relationship between trust and political subordination by focusing on assessing the credibility of witnesses.

Longino, Helen. 1990. *Science as Social Knowledge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

A foundational text for feminist epistemology that highights the social and normative character of scientific inquiry and knowledge production.

Longino, Helen. 2002. *The Fate of Knowledge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Argues for a way to reconcile debates between cognitive rationalist theories of knowledge and social constructivist theories by showing that social interactions and processes help produce rationally justified knowledge. This work builds on Longino 1990, expanding the argument and responding to contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science.

Tanesini, Alessandra. 2015. "Feminist Epistemology." Oxford Bibliographies Online.

An annotated bibliography on feminist epistemology covering the vast range of contributions feminist epistmologists have made from epistemic injustice and standpoint theory (emphasized here) to feminist philosophy of science, credibilitiy, and trust.

Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young famously defends a view of group difference grounded in structural relations of power and shows why this gives members of these groups unique perspectives on social life that are important for building social knowledge of a diverse community. Democratic dialogue across difference is essential in order to gain knowledge of how political proposals affect people in different social locations.

Epistemic Injustice

An influential recent branch of feminist political epistemology, with an explotion of literature following Miranda Fricker's introduction of the term in her 2007 monograph *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. While Fricker introduces the concept of epistemic injustice, Medina 2013 builds on this work to call for epistemic resistance to undermine and change oppressive norms. Dotson 2011 develops the work to highlight a pernicious form of silencing in a refusal to reciprocate, which she calls epistemic violence. Bohman 2012 is a special issue on Frickers work that includes important developments to the theory by leading epistemologists and political philosophers. Fricker 2015 offers a survey of current work on epistemic injustice, while Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus 2017 is comprehensive edited collection of work on this theme. A related set of themes is found in Sullivan and Tuana's 2007 collection on racism and the epistemology of ignorance. This collection builds on Charles Mills's influential "White Ignorance" and is also an important foundation for current work in the broad theme of epistemic injustice.

Bohman, James, ed. 2012. *Special Issue on Epistemic Injustice*. *Social Epistemology* 26 (2).

A special issue engaging with Fricker's 2007 book, which includes articles by Elizabeth Anderson on epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions, José Medina on hermeneutical responsibilities, James Bohman on the connection between epistemic injustice and republican theories of domination, and Karen Jones on intellectual self-trust, among other essays.

Dotson, Kristie. 2011. "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing." *Hypatia* 26: 236-257.

Develops an account of epistemic violence that is a refusal to reciprocate in linguistic exchange owing to pernicious ignorance tied to harmful silencing. Dotson distinguishes two kinds of silencing, testimonial quieting, in which the speaker is not recognized as a knower, and testimonial smothering, in which the speaker adjusts and truncates her testimony to better fit the audiences' testimonial incompetence.

Fricker, Miranda. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The primary text on epistemic injustice. Fricker argues there are two distinctively epistemic forms of injustice that harm individuals in their capacity as knowers: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Other scholars have proposed new forms of epistemic injustice, but Fricker's book is the foundation for the vast literature on epistemic injustice that now exists.

Fricker, Miranda. 2005. "Epistemic Injustice." Oxford Bibliographies Online.

An annotated bibliography on 'epistemic injustice' by the leading figure in the field. Fricker provides an extensive list of anthologies, overviews, and more specific work on various kinds of epistemic injustice, as well as references for epistemic injustice in the contexts of law, medicine, and education.

Kidd, Ian James, José Medina, and Gail Pohlhaus Jr. (eds.). 2017. *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. New York: Routledge.

The most extensive and comprehensive collection of work on epistemic injustice.

Medina, José. 2013. *The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations.* New York: Oxford University Press.

An epistemic analysis of the social conditions of oppression in democratic societies, and argues for epistemic resistance to undermine and change social norms.

Sullivan, Shannon and Nancy Tuana (eds.). 2007. *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.* **Albany: State University of New York Press.**

An important and much cited collection of essays discussing the epistemology of ignorance. This opens with Charles W. Mills's extremely influential essay "White Ignorance" and includes other widely cited important pieces on both the epistemology of ignorance and situating ignorance in our social and political context.

Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Theory

The idea of situated knowledge is that knowledge claims come from particular people whose social and cultural contexts impact what is known. Standpoint theory is an explicitly political as well as social epistemology. The core idea is that individuals who are subject to structures of domination that systematically marginalize and oppress may be epistemically privileged in some important ways by virtue of their experience. The first major articulation of this theory was by Hartsock 1983, who drew attention to the privileged standpoint that gives oppressed groups distinctive knowledge of their oppression. Standpoint theory took an important turn with Collins 1990 (cited above in Feminist Political Epistemology) who draws attention to black women's distinctive standpoint drawn from their intersectional oppression as both black and women in a racist patriarchal society. Collins 2009 expands on her influential work on black womens' knowledge to draw out explicit lessons for social justice and empowerment. Code 2006 develops her relational view of knowledge situated in a broader social context. Harding 2004 is an important collection of essays on feminist standpoint theory, including work by leading feminist epistemologists and political philosophers.

Code, Lorraine. 2006. *Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Code builds on her early work defending the importance of situating both individual knowers and their knowledge claims in the broader social, political, cultural, and historic context.

Collins, Patricia H. 2009. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge Classics.

The second edition of Collins's influential work expands her work on black women's knowledge as a tool for both empowerment and social justice.

Harding, Sandra (ed.). 2004. *The Feminist Standpoint Reader*. New York: Routledge.

This edited collection includes many extremely influential essays by feminist epistemologists and political philosophers, including heavily cited work by Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Uma Narayan, Catherine MacKinnon, Alison Jaggar, Sandra Harding, Susan Heckman, Sara Ruddick, Donna Haraway, Nancy Hartsock, and many others.

Hartsock, Nancy. 1983. "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism." In *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science*. Edited by Sandra G. Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.

The first philosophical articulation of the theory, which argues that women's place within patriarchy leads to a privileged epistemic standpoint for understanding the nature of women's oppression.

Political Cognition

Political cognition is, broadly put, the study of how the brain processes political information. A little more specifically, it is about how political beliefs and attitudes are influenced by a variety of social and psychological factors, such as emotion, bias, and social identity. Work in political cognition is conducted primarily by psychologists and social scientists, but it is highly relevant to epistemology and political philosophy. Campbell et al. 1960 is a foundational work on the nature of political beliefs and their connection to partisan identity. Haidt 2012 expands on this idea, arguing that our political beliefs are grounded in emotion and tribalism rather than rationality. This is supported by Iyengar et al. 2012, who claim that political polarization has little to do with our policy preferences and much to do with group identity. Sloman and Fernbach 2017 provide another defense of this idea, arguing that politics is largely influenced by group identity and "sacred values". Taber and Lodge 2006 illustrate that individuals tend to engage in motivated reasoning in order to confirm their pre-existing political beliefs. Popkin 1991, however, argues that relatively uninformed voters are nonetheless fairly rational, since they are able to make reasonable decisions on the basis of heuristics and information shortcuts.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A seminal study in voting behavior and a pioneering text for work on partisan identity. The book's main conclusions are: party identification is the principal determinant of voting; partisans are more knowledgeable (and politically active) than independents; party identification is largely affective and psychological rather than based on political preferences; the mass electorate have inconsistent ideological beliefs.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided By Politics and Religion*. London: Penguin Books.

A highly readable book about why it's so difficult for people to get along. In short, human nature is "groupish" and reasons have little persuasive power. Drawing on ethnography, philosophy, evolutionary theory, and experimental psychology, Haidt defends Hume's view that reason is a slave to emotion and used primarily for post-hoc rationalization.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76: 405-431.

A widely cited study about polarization in the United States. Instead of focusing on differences in policy preferences, the authors suggest we think of polarization in affective terms: it concerns the extent to which people dislike, even loathe, each other. This work is closely related to Mason 2018.

Popkin, Samuel. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A highly influential book about how voters form opinions and make decisions. Popkin argues that voters with little information can use "shortcuts" to make reliable decisions. He also argues against the view -- defended by Huemer 2016 and others -- that voters are irrational.

Sloman, Steven and Philip Fernbach. 2017. *The Knowledge Illusion*. New York: Riverhead Books.

Another attack on the ideal of the rational individual. The book's central claim is that humans rarely think for themselves; rather, we rely on groupthink. Further, we often hold strong views about policies we know little about and we cling to them because of group loyalty. A nice exploration of the role of group identity and sacred values in politics.

Taber, Charles and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* **50(3): 755-769.**

An influential argument for the prevalence of biased reasoning, which aims not at truth but at the vindication of prior opinions. Taber and Lodge illustrate that people will uncritically accept information that confirms their views (confirmation bias) and discount information that challenges their view (disconfirmation bias), with a specific focus on political issues. These results have profound implications for politics and normative theory.

Social Media and Democracy

In light of contemporary discussions about the effects social media companies have had on elections and political debate in countries around the world, philosophers have been investigating the intersection of our epistemic norms and political engagement. Pariser 2012 explains some of the technical reasons behind the personalization that drives divisions in political discussion. Miller and Record 2013 pick up on the personalization and automatic filtering of information to show how this challenges the justificatory status of beliefs formed by reliance on internet technologies, offering a new account of justification and epistemic responsibility to fit these circumstances. Sunstein 2017 picks up on Pariser to draw out an updated analysis of the problem of group polarization, the viral spread of information (and disinformation) through social media platforms, and the ways these further divide our democracy. Rini 2017 argues that despite being false, the spread of fake news is individually reasonable even if socially damaging-- attributing some of the problem to the lack of stable testimonial norms on social media. Lynch 2016 also analyzes epistemic norms on social media and our use of information technologies to show that while we have easy access to certain forms of knowledge, building deeper understanding is becoming more challenging. Frost-Arnold 2016 offers a hopeful account of overcoming prejudice online through trusting the testimony of oppressed groups.

Frost-Arnold, Karen. 2016. "Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of Prejudice." *Social Epistemology* **30(5-6): 513-531.**

Argues that hopeful trust in the testimony of members of oppressed groups can help remedy socially constructed ignorance, using the case of online attempts to challenge ignorance to make her case.

Lynch, Michael P. 2016. *The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data.* **New York: Liveright Publishing.**

An engaging examination of the impact of the internet and social media on our epistemic practices. Arguing that while certain ways of knowing are facilitated by social media, there are new threats to building deeper understanding. This book includes discussions of 'google-knowing,' truth and lies on social media, and the political economy of knowledge.

Miller, Boaz and Isaac Record. 2013. "Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies." *Episteme* **10(2): 117-134.**

Argues that the automatic filtering of information by internet technologies threatens the justificatory status of beliefs formed on that basis. They propose a new account of epistemic responsibility to try to determine whether one's information is biased or incomplete.

Pariser, Eli. 2012. *The Filter Bubble: What The Internet Is Hiding From You.* **Penguin.**

This book introduces the concept of filter bubbles and the way personalization of social media impacts how we consume information, make political decisions, and think about our world.

Rini, Regina. 2017. "Fake News and Partisan Epistemology." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* **27(2): 43-64.**

An influential analysis of the lack of testimonial norms on social media and argument that despite being damaging, the spread of 'fake news' is consistent with individual epistemic virtue.

Sunstein, Cass. 2017. *#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media.* **Princeton: Princeton University Press.**

This book builds on Sunstein's 2002 article on groups polarization, updating it to account for the ways social media platforms influence the information people gather and norms of political engagement. It includes an updated analysis of group polarization as well as discussions of how information spreads through social media platforms and the implications for free speech. The book concludes with a set of recommendations to overcome these threats to democracy.